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THE VOLCKER RULE AND THE PRESUMPTION
AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY:
UTTERLY INCOMPATIBLE
CHRISTINE P. HENRY*
ABSTRACT
The Volcker Rule, enacted in 2010 as part ofthe Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Consumer Protection Act to address the too big to 
fail problem in todays interconnected global economy, has been 
controversialfrom the outset. The deadline for banks to comply
with Volcker regulations has been extended severaltimes, with
the most recent deadline set for July 21, 2016. This Note ex-
amines the impact ofthe Volcker Rule on foreign banks, detailing
the specificeffects ofVolcker regulations on two prominent German
banks, Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, and analyzes the coun-
tervailing European approach to regulating proprietary trading
andriskyinvestment.
This Note argues that the extraterritorialreach ofthe Volcker
Rule should be limited in order to complywith the presumption
against extraterritoriality. While there is likely no perfect solu-
tion to preventing the too big to fail phenomenon, this Note pro-
poses one alternative, whichappropriatelylimits the extraterritorial
scope ofthe Volcker Rule while preserving a primaryaim ofthe
Volcker legislation: exempt foreign banks with only minor U.S.
subsidiaries comprising less than 25 percent of the foreign banks 
overalloperations from the Volcker Rule.
* The author is a J.D. Candidate at William & Mary Law School; B.A.,
University of Virginia. She wishes to thank the staff and editorial board of
the William & MaryBusiness Law Review for their diligence throughout the
publication process; Rebecca Parry for her insightful comments; and her family
and friends for their unwavering support.
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INTRODUCTION
Paul Volcker, chair of President Obamas Economic Recovery 
Advisory Board and the grandson of German immigrants,1 served
as the mastermind behind the Volcker Rule.2 However, he failed to
consider how extraterritorial application of the Volcker Rule
might affect banks back home in Germany. Enacted in July
2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumer Protection
Act,3 the Volcker Rule remains highly controversial.4 The im-
pending July 2016 deadline5 for financial institutions to comply
1 Paul Volcker also served as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board from
1979 until 1987. WILLIAM L. SILBER, VOLCKER: THE TRIUMPH OF PERSISTENCE
336 (2012).
2 The Volcker Rule prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading
and restricts banks private equity activity, including investment in hedge 
funds. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851).
3 Id.
4 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The PoliticalEconomyofDodd-Frank: WhyFinan-
cialReform Tends to be Frustrated and SystemicRiskPerpetuated, 97 CORNELL
L. REV. 1019, 107375 (2012) (arguing that the Volcker Rule does not ade-
quately address the too big to fail problem because there is no evidence that 
proprietary trading caused the 2008 financial crisis, and that the Volcker Rule
is ineffective because it contains too many loopholes and exceptions); Alison
K. Gary, Comment, Creating a Future EconomicCrisis: PoliticalFailure and the
Loopholes ofthe Volcker Rule, 90 OR. L. REV. 1339 (2012) (arguing that the
Volcker Rule represents a political failure); Rex Chatterjee, Dictionaries Fail:
The Volcker Rules Reliance on Definitions Renders it Ineffective and a New 
Solution is Needed to Adequately Regulate Proprietary Trading, 8 B.Y.U.
INTL L. & MGMT. REV. 33 (2011) (arguing that the Volcker Rule is ineffective
and proposing an alternative regime to solve the proprietary trading problem);
Ryan K. Brissette, The Volcker Rules Unintended Consequences, 15 N.C. BANK-
ING INST. 231, 23435 (2011) (arguing that the Volcker Rule does not conform 
to the primary purpose behind the Rule and that restricting proprietary trading
does not solve the problem the Volcker Rule was designed to address).
5 The deadline for banks to comply with Volcker regulations has been
pushed back several times. After the final Rule was promulgated in December of
2013, banking entities were required to comply by July 2015. On December
18, 2014, the Federal Reserve Board announced that it was extending this
deadline to July 21, 2016 for legacy covered funds, defined as funds that 
were in place prior to December 31, 2013. Thus, banks have an additional
year in which to conform their investments to Volcker regulations. The Fed-
eral Reserve Board also announced that it intends to provide yet another one-
year extension until July 21, 2017. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
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with Mr. Volckers regulations has brought the Volcker Rule into 
the spotlight, generating substantial criticism of this legislation
designed to address the too big to fail problem.6
While the effects of the Volcker Rule on U.S. banks have been
extensively investigated and documented, this Note focuses in-
stead on the effects of this Rule on German banks, specifically
Deutsche Bank and Commerzbanklarge German banks with 
substantial subsidiaries in the United States. This Note documents
both the critical European reaction to the Volcker Rule as well
as the European approach to prevent the too big to fail phe-
nomenon. This Note argues that extraterritorial application of the
Volcker Rule should be limited without sacrificing the overall aim
of the legislation. Volcker regulations should only reach foreign
banks with substantial U.S. subsidiaries, as well as subsidiaries
of U.S. banks abroad, but not foreign banks with only minor U.S.
subsidiaries that comprise less than 25 percent of the foreign
banks overall operations. While there is no uniquely perfect
solution to preventing the too big to fail phenomenon in todays 
truly global economy, this proposal effectively limits the extrater-
ritorial reach of the Volcker Rule, while also aptly preserving
Mr. Volckers aims.7
This Note is organized as follows. Part I discusses the histor-
ical underpinnings and background of the Volcker Rule. Part II
explores European criticism of the Volcker Rule and documents
the effects of the Volcker Rule on two large German banks,
Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank. Part III argues that the ex-
traterritorial reach of the Volcker Rule should be limited to con-
form with the presumption against extraterritoriality. Part IV
lays out the European approach to preventing the too big to fail 
phenomenon. Finally, Part V proposes a solution that limits the
/press/bcreg/20141218a.htm [https://perma.cc/H7ZB-TT26]. Recently, the Re-
publican Party has sought to scale back several Dodd-Frank provisions, in-
cluding the Volcker Rule; the continued delay in implementation of the Volcker
Rule led President Obama to threaten to veto the Republican Volcker-delay 
bill in January 2015. Emily Stephenson, Obama threatens veto ofRepublican
Volcker-delay Bill, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2015, 6:16 PM), http://uk.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-congress-volcker-idUSKBN0KL2BX20150112 [https://perma.cc
/XNA6-G6VR].
6 See GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS
OF BANK BAILOUTS (2009) for an overview of the too big to fail phenomenon. 
7 Coffee, supra note 4.
2016] THE VOLCKER RULE 829
extraterritorial effect of the Volcker Rule without sacrificing its
noble aims.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE VOLCKER RULE
The Volcker Rule (the Rule) was passed as part of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(the Dodd-Frank Act) in July 2010.8 A primary aim of the
Obama administration was to address the too big to fail9 prob-
lem and recent financial recession by implementing wide-reaching
legislation touching all areas of banking law and significantly
affecting the financial services industry.10 More specifically, the
Dodd-Frank Act was implemented to promote the financial sta-
bility of the United States by improving accountability and trans-
parency in the financial system, to end too big to fail, to protect
the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect con-
sumers from abusive financial services practices.11 In support of
the comprehensive Dodd-Frank financial regulatory scheme, the
Volcker Rule prevent[s] banks ... as the central actors in the fi-
nancial world, from bringing down the whole system through
8 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851).
9 Too big to fail refers to the problem of systemic risk in an intercon-
nected global economy. This problem comes in three distinct flavors:
(1) A financial institution can simply be too big to fail. Citigroup 
probably is, but Lehman was perceived not to be.
(2) An institution can be too connected to fail, largely a result
of the increased use of OTC derivatives, including credit default
swaps. As a result, the failure of one can imply the eventual
failure of its counterparties in a cascade of falling financial
dominoes. This scenario explains the government's bailout of
AIG, upon whom all other major financial institutions relied
on for protection.
(3) Financial institutions can also be too risk-correlated to fail,
with the result that the failure of one implies intense stress
on the others. Although policies such as diversification can
manage uncorrelated risk, risks that are correlated cannot be
similarly resolved or protected against.
Coffee, supra note 4, at 105657. 
10 WallStreet Reform: The Dodd-FrankAct, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www
.whitehouse.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform [https://
perma.cc/AA6D-HM8L].
11 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012).
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risky speculation.12 The Obama administration further describes
the purpose of the Rule in very broad terms, as a measure to en-
sure that banks are no longer allowed to own, invest, or sponsor
hedge funds, private equity funds, or proprietary trading opera-
tions for their own profit, unrelated to serving their customers.13
After the notice and comment rulemaking process, the final
version of the Rule was issued on December 10, 2013.14 The Volcker
Rule effectively prohibits U.S. banks, as well as foreign banks with
U.S. subsidiaries, from engaging in proprietary trading,15 and also
restricts their private equity activity, including investment in
hedge funds.16
The Volcker Rule applies to banking entities, defined as 
(i) any insured depository institution; (ii) any company that con-
trols an insured depository institution; (iii) any [foreign banking
organization]; and (iv) any affiliate of the foregoing.17
The specific language of the Volcker Rule prohibits the acqui-
sition of ownership interests in covered funds by any banking 
entity, or sponsoring a covered fund.18 The proposed Rule broadly
defined a covered fund as: 
12 Christoph Scherrer, Finance capitalwillnot fade away on its own, in
DONT WASTE THE CRISIS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR A NEW ECONOMIC MODEL
32 (Nicolas Pons-Vignon ed., 2010).
13 WallStreet Reform: The Dodd-FrankAct, supra note 10.
14 Henry M. Field & Barbara R. Mendelson, The Volcker Rule: Impact of
the FinalRule on Foreign Banking Organizations, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
(Dec. 13, 2013), http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/131211-Volcker
-Rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/WV86-TGRT].
15 The Volcker Rule defines proprietary trading as engaging as a prin-
cipal for the trading account of the banking entity ... to purchase or sell, or
otherwise acquire or dispose of, any security, any derivative, any contract of
sale of a commodity for future delivery [and] any option on such security, deriva-
tive, or contract. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4). William Silber aptly describes pro-
prietary trading as a polite euphemism for speculation. SILBER, supra note
1, at 281.
16 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(A)(B); WallStreet Reform: The Dodd-FrankAct,
supra note 10.
17 MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, A USERS GUIDE TO THE VOLCKER RULE 4
(Feb. 18, 2014) (parenthetical omitted), http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads
/Images/131223-A-Users-Guide-to-The-Volcker-Rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8XY
-B23F].
18 SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, VOLCKER RULE: AGENCIES APPROVE LONG-
AWAITED FINAL RULE; MOST REQUIREMENTS TO TAKE EFFECT ON JULY 21,
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any issuer that relies on Section 3(c)(1) or Section
3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940;
a commodity pool (i.e. an enterprise operated for
the purpose of trading in commodity interests); and
certain foreign funds.19
Under the final Volcker Rule, the definition of a foreign covered 
fund was narrowed, but still included funds sponsored by a U.S. 
banking entity or an affiliate that satisfies three requirements:
(i) the fund must be, or hold itself out as, an entity that raises
money from investors primarily for the purpose of investing in
securities for resale or other disposition or otherwise trading in
securities; (ii) the fund must be organized abroad, and (iii) its
ownership interests must be offered and sold solely outside the
United States.20
If a U.S. entity invests in such a fund, it is clearly subject to
Volcker regulations, but if a foreign bank invests in this same
fund solely outside of the United States, that foreign bank is
exempt from the Volcker Rule.21 The third prong of the foreign 
covered fund definition is included in order to prevent U.S. 
banking entities from using this loophole to avoid compliance
with Volcker regulations when investing in a foreign fund.22
However, the only corresponding exemption for a foreign bank-
ing entity is the solely outside of the United States exception.23
Beginning with the proposed Rule and continuing through
passage of the final Rule, practitioners have debated regarding
how broadly the definition of a covered fund should be read, 
and just how far the Volcker Rule should reach.24 Clearly, U.S.
2015, app. A-8 (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications
/SC_Publication_Volcker_Rule_5C6B.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H6F-8NLJ].
19 Id.
20 Field & Mendelson, supra note 14, at 4.
21 Id.
22 MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, A USERS GUIDE TO THE VOLCKER RULE,
supra note 17.
23 See infra notes 3334 and accompanying text for a more in-depth dis-
cussion of the solely outside of the United States exception to the Volcker Rule. 
24 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain
Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds,
79 Fed. Reg. 5536 (Jan. 31, 2014).
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banks are subject to Volcker regulations. The subsidiaries of
U.S. banks abroad must also comply with the Rule.25 More prob-
lematic, however, is the fact that German banks with subsidiaries
located in the United States, including both Deutsche Bank and
Commerzbank, are subject to Volcker regulations, regardless of
the size of their subsidiaries.26
Banking entities subject to the Volcker Rule must meet sev-
eral requirements. In order to comply with these new regulations,
banks must expend considerable resources to ensure that the
bank takes steps in four important areas: (1) effective compli-
ance and reporting standards; (2) comprehensive data gathering
and reporting structures; (3) compensation and governance; and
(4) communication and culture.27 Mayer Brown LLP, an interna-
tional law firm, details tasks that German banks affected by the
Volcker Rule are required to engage in before the conformance
period ends in July 2016:
Develop a conformance plan based on final regula-
tions;
Assess activities subject to the Volcker Rule, includ-
ing any necessary reliance on exemptions;
Make good faith efforts to be in a position to comply
fully by the end of the conformance period;
Determine if and when reporting metrics will apply
for proprietary trading exemptions; and
Determine scope of applicable compliance require-
ments and develop compliance programs as soon as
practicable.28
25 DAVIS POLK LLP, FINAL VOLCKER RULE REGULATIONS 34 (Jan. 6, 2014), 
http://www.davispolk.com/dodd-frank/memoranda/volcker-rule/ [https://perma
.cc/M5MX-JWFS].
26 Id.
27 Steve Culp, FinalVolcker Rule Leaves Banks Facing Compliance Hurdles,
FORBES (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveculp/2013/12/17/final
-volcker-rule-leaves-banks-facing-compliance-hurdles/.
28 MAYER BROWN, IMPACT OF VOLCKER, THE EU PROPOSAL AND TRENN-
BANKENGESETZ ON GERMAN BANKS (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.mayerbrown
.com/files/Event/6de9e941-6ac1-4226-833a-9a3ba3741d3e/Presentation/Event
Attachment/405445b1-b027-4e28-9e33-c02d34957e1a/140213-Presentation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3BM8-ZRBL] (emphasis added).
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While U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks must expend consid-
erable resources in order to successfully comply with Volcker
regulations for prohibited activities, the foreign parent bank might
also attempt to relocate its proprietary trading outside of the United
States in order to avoid compliance costs. Either way, the foreign
bank is significantly affected by Volcker regulations, whether
directly through compliance costs imposed on its U.S. subsidiary,
or indirectly due to a desire to move proprietary trading offshore
to evade Volcker regulation.29 Linklaters, an international law
firm, described the effect of the Volcker Rule on foreign banks
particularly well: [t]he Volcker Rule will constrain the world-
wide activities of virtually all internationally active non-U.S.
banks and their affiliates. In the absence of an exception, both
proprietary trading in most financial instruments and sponsorship
of and investment in alternative funds will be prohibited.30
While the Volcker Rule imposes stringent requirements on
institutions considered covered entities, the Rule also includes 
several notable exceptions.31 Perhaps the exceptions even under-
mine the Rule entirely, as even the dumbest banker can get 
around the Volcker Rule.32
The primary exception applies to banking entities solely out-
side of the [United States], commonly known as the SOTUS 
exception.33 The SOTUS exception exempts foreign banks pro-
prietary trading from the Volcker Rule if the banks comply with
two requirements: (1) propriety trading occurs outside of the
29 See also John C. Coffee, Jr., ExtraterritorialFinancialRegulation: Why
E.T. Cant Come Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1289 (2014) (arguing that
the Volcker Rule does apply extraterritorially to foreign banks by requiring
them to meet compliance obligations to ensure that their offshore proprietary
trading qualifies for an exemption from the Volcker Rule).
30 LINKLATERS LLP, THE FINAL VOLCKER RULE AND ITS EXTRATERRITORIAL
CONSEQUENCES FOR NON-U.S. BANKS (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.linklaters
.com/Insights/US-Publications/Pages/Final-Volcker-Rule-Extraterritorial-Con
sequences-Non-US-Banks.aspx [https://perma.cc/2U87-BBMA].
31 A common criticism of the Volcker Rule is that it provides far too many
exceptions, thereby inviting banks to seek out loopholes to avoid being subject
to Volcker regulations. See Lee Sheppard, The Loopholes in the Volcker Rule,
FORBES (Jan. 8, 2014, 10:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/leesheppard
/2014/01/08/the-loopholes-in-the-volcker-rule/; Gary, supra note 4.
32 Sheppard, supra note 31.
33 See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(H) (2012).
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United States; and (2) the banking entity is not directly or indi-
rectly controlled by a banking entity that is organized in the 
United States.34 A foreign bank with only one branch office lo-
cated in the United States is thus subject to the Volcker Rule,
absent a showing that the disputed transaction occurred solely 
outside of the United States.35 In effect, a foreign bank is only
exempt from the Volcker Rule if the bank can demonstrate that
it has no territorial or corporate connection to the United States,
a very difficult test to meet in todays interconnected global 
economy.36 Large German banks, including both Deutsche Bank
and Commerzbank, have significant U.S. subsidiaries37 and are
unable to disentangle their operations sufficiently to take ad-
vantage of the SOTUS exception. Therefore, both banks must
comply with Volcker regulations.
II. EUROPEAN RECEPTION OF THE VOLCKER RULE
The European reaction to the passage of the Volcker Rule proved
especially negative from the outset. This Part details the European
consensus following passage of the Volcker Rule and provides a
case study analyzing the specific impact of the Volcker Rule on
two large German banks, Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank.
A. The European FinancialCommunityHeavilyCriticizes the
Volcker Rule
Originally, the general consensus within Germany was that
the Volcker Rule would only impact Deutsche Bank, but the
final Rule, when passed, required compliance from twelve German
banks.38 As of December 2013, the number of affected German
34 Id.
35 See Coffee, supra note 29, at 1288 (agreeing that a line-drawing exercise
is necessary).
36 Id.
37 See infra Part II.B for an overview of the structure and revenues of both
Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank.
38 Eyk Henning, Ainsley Thomson & Geoffrey T. Smith, Volcker Rule, EU-
Style: Germany, U.K. Move to Tackle ProprietaryTrading byBanks, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 4, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324
900204578283971336611166 [https://perma.cc/J7VT-27W9].
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banks increased to fifteen, and includes Deutsche Bank, Com-
merzbank, and UniCredit.39 Noting that the United States con-
stitutes a core market of Deutsche Bank, a prominent German
newspaper, Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung, revealed substantial
unease regarding the potentially significant impact of the Volcker
Rule on German banks.40 The reaction of German financial or-
ganizations proved especially negative, and heavy criticism was
levied even before the final Volcker Rule was promulgated.41
As early as December 2012, Commerzbank already recognized
the potential for significant impact of the Volcker Rule in the risk 
factors section of one of its registration statements.42 Commerz-
banks early identification of Dodd-Frank regulation as a poten-
tially significant risk to its business reflects the strong animosity
German banks felt, and still feel, towards the Volcker Rule.
Deutsche Bank also submitted several comments during the
notice and comment period prior to adoption of the Volcker Rule,
primarily arguing for a narrow reading of covered funds, and 
providing explanations for how a broader reading of this term might
adversely impact Deutsche Banks business activities and its 
customers.43 Deutsche Bank also supported the creation of addi-
tional statutory exemptions for underwriting, market-making 
39 Norbert Kuls, Maximilian Weingartner & Hanno Mussler, Nach der
Volcker Regel: Warum Goldman Sachs jetzt um Milliarden zittert, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft
/wirtschaftspolitik/nach-der-volcker-regel-warum-goldman-sachs-jetzt-um-mil
liarden-zittert-12706754.html [https://perma.cc/8CZU-2DHT].
40 Id.
41 See Henning et al., supra note 38; Kuls et al., supra note 39.
42 COMMERZBANK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, REGISTRATION DOC. (Dec. 12, 2012),
https://www.commerzbank.com/media/aktionaere/emissionsprogramme/reg
istrierungsformular_2/Registrierungsformular12122012_en.pdf [https://perma
.cc/UVT5-BMRP]. Commerzbank included the following language anticipating
potential effects from the impact of the Volcker Rule in Germany:
Although is it not yet clear what effects the legislative amend-
ments in connection with the Dodd-Frank Act and EMIR will
have, many elements of this new legislation could lead to
changes which would affect the profitability of the Groups busi-
ness activities, require adaptations to its commercial practices,
or increase its costs, including the compliance costs.
Id.
43 Deutsche Bank, Comment Letter on Volcker Rule (Feb. 13, 2012), http://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-284.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ECZ-PANA].
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related activities and risk-mitigating hedging, and advocated 
for applying those exemptions to both the covered funds and
proprietary trading portions of the Rule.44
Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management e.V.
(BVI),45 a trade association representing the German investment
fund and management industry, similarly submitted comments
to the proposed Volcker Rule.46 Among several criticisms, the
organization primarily took issue with the overly broad lan-
guage pertaining to covered funds, and argued that this defini-
tion should be restricted so that non-U.S. regulated funds, such
as funds regulated by the Undertakings for the Collective Invest-
ment of Transferable Securities (UCITS),47 would be excluded.48
Further, Deutsche Bundesbank,49 the central bank of the Federal
Republic of Germany, criticized two core components of the
Volcker Rule as applied to German banks, namely the problem-
atic extraterritorial reach of the Rule and an exception permit-
ted only for U.S. governmental proprietary trading.50 Deutsche
44 Id.
45 BVI represents eighty-two members handling assets in the amount of
1.8 trillion, comprised of both investment funds and individual accounts. 
The organization also assists 50 million private clients in capital management.
BVI, Comments on OCC Docket No. OCC-2011-14; FRB Docket No. R-1432
and RIN 7100 AD 82; FDIC RIN 3064-AD85 [hereinafter BVI, Comments];
SEC File No. S7-41-11: Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading
and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private
Equity Funds 2 (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74
111-213.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SYB-JSPE].
46 Id.
47 UCITS is an organization that coordinates the distribution and manage-
ment of unit trusts within the European Union. Undertakings For The Collective
Investment ofTransferable Securities - UCITS, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.in
vestopedia.com/terms/u/ucits.asp [https://perma.cc/VX9E-MU6N]. These funds
are marketed solely within the European Union, subject to the disclosure re-
quirements of the individual country. Id.
48 BVI Comments, supra note 45, at 6.
49 Deutsche Bundesbank is the central bank of the Federal Republic of
Germany. DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation
/EN/Tasks/tasks.html?startpageId=Startseite-EN&startpageAreaId=Naviga
tionsbereich&startpageLinkName=tasks+1736 [https://perma.cc/3RM2-RRQT].
Deutsche Bundesbanks core business areas are comprised of the Eurosystem 
monetary policy, banking supervision, and cash operations. Id.
50 Deutsche Bundesbank, Letter to the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Securities
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Bundesbank argued that the Volcker Rule imposes U.S. obliga-
tions on non-U.S. entities, essentially suggesting that the Volcker
Rule might violate principles of extraterritoriality and urging the
relevant U.S. organizations responsible for implementing the
Volcker Rule to take a closer look at its extraterritorial reach.51
The notice and comment process for the Volcker Rule stretched
on, and legislators took the concerns of European representatives
to heart. The final Volcker Rules prohibition on proprietary trad-
ing exempts the following activities from the Rule:
trading in U.S. government or government agency
securities;
trading in municipal bonds;
trading by a foreign affiliate of a U.S. banking entity
of debt of a foreign sovereign (including any multi-
national central bank of which the foreign sovereign
is a member), or of any agency or political subdivision
of that foreign government, issued by the foreign
country in which the foreign affiliate is organized, if
the affiliate is a foreign bank or regulated by the
foreign sovereign as a securities dealer and the
trading is not financed by an affiliate located in the
United States or organized under U.S. law;
trading on behalf of a customer in a fiduciary capac-
ity or as riskless principal; and
trading by a banking entity that is a regulated in-
surance company (including a foreign insurance
company), whether for the insurance companys 
general account or for a separate account.52
This expanded list of exemptions reflects the numerous criti-
cal comments received before Congress promulgated the final
Volcker Rule in December 2013.53
After the final Volcker Rule was passed, European organiza-
tions continued to criticize the Rule. Erkii Liikanen, Chair of the
and Exchange Commission Regarding the Volcker Rule (Feb. 10, 2012), http://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-222.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AG3-SG87].
51 Id.
52 MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, A USERS GUIDE TO THE VOLCKER RULE,
supra note 17, at 11.
53 Field et al., supra note 14.
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European Unions High Level Expert Group on Banking Reform, 
in the Liikanen Report,54 criticized the Volcker Rule for being
both the most narrow because it primarily targets proprietary
trading, and the most radical approach to addressing the prob-
lem of risky proprietary trading.55 Liikanen reasoned that the
Volcker Rules absolute ban on proprietary trading within the
entire banking group was especially radical.56 Liikanens less 
radical approach, as proposed in his report to the E.U. Commission,
involves banks separating their investment banking operations
from retail banking operations.57 In doing so, Liikanen supported
the separation of risky activities rather than an outright prohi-
bition on proprietary trading.58
Similarly, BVI continued to attack the Rule due to its poten-
tial for placing undue burdens on the financial system as a
whole.59 An article published by the WallStreet Journalentitled
German Banks Fear the Consequences of the Volcker Rule sum-
marizes the core fears of German banks in the wake of passage
of the Rule: the Rule imposes widespread and contradictory 
demands on German banks.60 Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank
are both mentioned in the article, although their representatives
declined to comment on the potential impact of the Rule on their
respective companies.61 French E.U. Commissioner Michael Barnier
complained that [the E.U.] cant accept extraterritorial conse-
quences or Europe will be tempted to do the same thing.62 While
the adoption of an exception for the trading of foreign debt quelled
the concerns of many critics, several foreign organizations and
54 See infra Part IV for a discussion of the Liikanen Report.
55 Chair ofE.U. Expert Group Calls Volcker Rule the Most Narrow and
RadicalApproach, 7 Hedge Funds & Private Equity 3, 2013 WL 2959221 (CCH).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Christian Grimm, Deutsche Banken fuerchten Folgen der Volcker-Regel,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://www.wsj.de/nachrichten/SB10001
424052702303293604579251900984954482 [https://perma.cc/BF39-VHRF].
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Francesco Guerrera, Tracy Corrigan & Simon Nixon, EU Red-Flags
Volcker, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424052970204573704577185100193763384 [https://perma.cc/AG96-Y75N].
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officials continued to heavily criticize the Volcker Rules poten-
tial to inflict negative systemic consequences.63
B. Case Study: The Effects ofthe Volcker Rule on Deutsche Bank
and Commerzbank
Deutsche Banks early history reflects a commitment to in-
ternational expansion. Deutsche Bank was founded in 1870 with
the goal of transact[ing] banking business ... in particular to 
promote and facilitate trade relations between Germany, other
European countries and overseas markets.64 After a tumultu-
ous few decades, Deutsche Bank began to focus on international
commitments in the 1970s, and became a global player begin-
ning in 1989 when it merged with Bankers Trust and became
influential in the American market.65 Deutsche Banks modern 
network remains extensive, as it is now present in over seventy
countries.66 Deutsche Bank retains a strong presence in the
United States, as Deutsche Bank Americas contributes approx-
imately 26 percent of the total Deutsche Bank revenues.67
Founded in 1870 in Hamburg, Commerzbank began investi-
gating international opportunities during the period from 1970
to 1990, when it founded the Europartners Group, an association
of banks dedicated to pursuing international opportunities.68 In
2008, Commerzbank merged with Dresdner Bank and became a
European and global powerhouse.69 Today, Commerzbank is a
leading international bank with branches and offices in more
than fifty countries.70 While this prominent financial institution
63 Id.
64 Deutsche Bank History: Chronicle from 1870 until Today, DEUTSCHE
BANK, https://www.db.com/en/media/Deutsche-Bank-History--Chronicle-from
-1870-until-today.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR2R-G9Q3].
65 Id.
66 See GlobalNetwork, DEUTSCHE BANK, https://www.db.com/en/content
/company/Global-Network.htm [https://perma.cc/5T38-HUWZ].
67 Deutsche Bank in the USA, DEUTSCHE BANK, https://www.db.com/usa
/content/en/company.html [https://perma.cc/X47A-KCYA].
68 Time Bar, COMMERZBANK, https://www.commerzbank.de/en/hauptnaviga
tion/konzern/geschichte/zeitstrahl/Zeitstrahl.html [https://perma.cc/G9Q8-CT6D].
69 Id.
70 Commerzbankat a glance, COMMERZBANK, https://www.commerzbank.com
/en/hauptnavigation/konzern/commerzbank_im__berblick/commerzbank_ueber
blick.html [https://perma.cc/HW25-MN54].
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has grown significantly in the past few decades, its core markets
remain Germany and Poland.71 In 2013, Commerzbank generated
gross revenues amounting to 9 billion.72
The Volcker Rule imposes substantial compliance costs on
Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank. In addition to satisfying ro-
bust, complicated, and acronym-filled compliance measures,73 the
final Volcker Rule imposes significant reporting and recordkeep-
ing requirements when banks engage in prohibited proprietary
trading of covered funds.74 Furthermore, to satisfy the extensive
reporting requirements, the Volcker Rule also compels banks to
institute a program designed to prevent future violations of the
Rule.75 The program, which requires periodic review by senior
management, is designed to instill in employees a culture of com-
pliance with the Rule.76 On top of these compliance requirements,
the CEO of the bank must annually certify that the banking
entity has appropriate procedures in place to comply with Volcker
regulations.77 In the case of foreign banking organizations, includ-
ing Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, the senior management of-
ficer of the U.S. subsidiary must provide the requisite certification.78
Proponents of the Volcker Rule argue that the prohibition on
proprietary trading and the corresponding compliance measures
are necessary in order to effectively protect U.S. taxpayers from
a repeat of 2008, when taxpayers bailed out failing financial in-
stitutions that had overindulged in foreign derivatives trading.79
Further, proponents urge that these measures simultaneously help
to protect the global financial system from systemic risk in an
unstable global economy.80
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 The compliance measures are set out in Appendix A (Reporting and Rec-
ordkeeping Requirements for Covered Trading Activities) and Appendix B (En-
hanced Minimum Standards for Compliance Programs). 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012).
74 MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, A USERS GUIDE TO THE VOLCKER RULE,
supra note 17.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Michael Greenberger, The ExtraterritorialProvisions ofthe Dodd-Frank
Act Protects U.S. Taxpayers from Worldwide Bailouts, 80 UMKC L. REV. 965,
96566 (2012). 
80 Id.
2016] THE VOLCKER RULE 841
While the policy justification for the Volcker regulation centers
on a desire to avoid adverse systemic consequences of proprie-
tary trading, this rationale fails to consider the significant com-
pliance costs the Rule imposes on foreign banks. Foreign banks
with only a minor presence in the United States face substantial
burdens in the name of compliance with the Rule. Proponents of
the Volcker Rule should more fully weigh the significant compliance
costs attached to the Rule.
III. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE VOLCKER RULE
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO CONFORM TO THE PRESUMPTION
AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The presumption against extraterritoriality, first set out in
Morrison, and extended in Kiobel, Microsoft Corp., and most re-
cently in Madoff, should operate to limit the extraterritorial reach
of the Volcker Rule, as applied to foreign banks. This Part lays out
the jurisprudence of the presumption against extraterritoriality,
analyzes this presumption as applied to the Volcker Rule, and ar-
gues that the current Volcker Rule therefore requires amendment.
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The presumption against extraterritoriality is an accepted
canon of construction and longstanding principle of American
law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent ap-
pears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.81 The Supreme Court has employed this
approach repeatedly, especially in the context of determining
whether certain U.S. laws apply abroad.82
In Morrison v. Natl Australia Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its commitment to the presumption against extra-
territoriality.83 The Court extended this presumption to cases
arising under the Securities & Exchange Act,84 and held that
81 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
82 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (reinforcing
the Morrison holding and applying the presumption against extraterritori-
ality to the Alien Tort Statute); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746
(2007) (applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to a patent case).
83 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
84 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2016).
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Rule 10b-585 did not apply extraterritorially.86 The Morrison Court
relied on the distinction between the language of Section 10(b)
and Section 30(a).87 While Section 10(b) contains no explicit state-
ment regarding extraterritorial application, Section 30(a) does.88
Using this distinction to reinforce the presumption against extra-
territoriality, the Court reasoned that Congress did not intend
for Section 10(b) to apply extraterritorially.89
The Court further noted that when a statute contains a pro-
vision for extraterritorial application, the presumption still operates
by limiting that provision solely to those terms.90 The Morrison
Court thus compels a narrow reading of statutory language per-
taining to extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. The Court
emphasized its point in a poetic statement:
For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application
that lacks allcontact with the territory of the United States.
But the presumption against extraterritorial application would
be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel when-
ever some domestic activity is involved in the case.91
Just as Deutsche Bundesbank recognized the potentially prob-
lematic components of the Volcker Rule, so too did several European
organizations, such as the Federation of German Industries, the
French Business Confederation, and the European Banking Fed-
eration, all urging that applying U.S. securities regulation abroad
would detrimentally interfere with foreign securities regulation.92
85 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016). The United States Securities and Exchange
Commissions rule targets securities fraud by prohibiting any act or omission re-
sulting in fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
86 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 26365. 
87 Id. at 26165. 
88 Id.
89 Id. at 265. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit extended this
holding in United States v. Vilar, concluding that Rule 10b-5 does not apply
to extraterritorial conduct, regardless of whether the conduct is criminal or
civil. 729 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2013).
90 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265.
91 Id. at 266.
92 The following organizations also joined in criticizing extraterritorial ap-
plication of Rule 10b-5, pushing for a clear test to avoid undue interference with
foreign securities regulation: the International Chamber of Commerce, the Swiss
Bankers Association, the Institute of International Bankers, the Australian
Bankers Association, and the Association Francaise des Enterprises Privées. 
Id. at 269.
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The Morrison Court ultimately adopted a test that assuaged
these concerns. In order for Rule 10b-5 to apply, one of two con-
ditions must be met: (1) the purchase or sale must be made in the
United States; or (2) the transaction must involve a security listed
on a domestic exchange.93
On the opposing side, the Solicitor General proposed a test
suggesting that Rule 10b-5 should apply extraterritorially to fraud
involving significant and material conduct in the United States, 
purporting that this approach better promotes ethics and prevents
the United States from becoming a Barbary Coast for perpe-
trating fraud.94 The Court ultimately rejected this proposal and
its supporting case law because it did not adhere to the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality nor the Courts narrow 
reading of statutory provisions that explicitly provide for extra-
territorial application.95
More recently, in July of 2014, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York adhered to the presumption
against extraterritoriality in holding that Section 550(a)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code96 does not apply extraterritorially. In Sec.
Investor Protection Corp. v. BernardMadoffInvestment Secs. LLC,97
the trustee appointed under the Securities Investor Protection Act
(SIPA) sought to recover funds that were transferred by foreign
feeder funds98 to various foreign customers.99 The court applied a
two-step test for determining whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality applied to the situation at hand: (1) whether
the factual circumstances at issue require an extraterritorial ap-
plication of the federal statutory provision; and (2) if so, whether
Congress intended for the statute to apply extraterritorially.100
The court held that the first prong was satisfied because recovery
93 Id. at 26970. 
94 Id. at 27073. 
95 Id.
96 11 U.S.C.A. § 550(a)(2) (2015).
97 513 B.R. 222, 225 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
98 Feeder funds are funds that collectively feed into a master fund (an 
umbrella), which oversees both the trading activity and portfolio investments
of all of the funds. Feeder funds are commonly used by hedge funds as a method
of pooling investment capital. Feeder Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investope
dia.com/terms/f/feederfund.asp [https://perma.cc/3FL4-9BFW].
99 Madoff, 513 B.R. at 225.
100 Id. at 226 (citing In re Maxwell Commcn Corp., 186 B.R. 807, 816 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
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of the requested foreign funds would require an extraterritorial
application of § 550(a)(2) to reach purely foreign feeder funds.101
Next, under the second prong, the court found that SIPAs focus 
was primarily domestic, noting a lack of intent by Congress to
extend SIPA internationally.102 The court additionally held that
even if the presumption against extraterritoriality was rebutted,
contrary to the analysis set out above, use of § 550(a) to reach for-
eign transfers would violate international comity principles.103
Thus, the Madoffcourt held that § 550(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code could not reach extraterritorially, so the trustee was unable
to recover any money transferred from the foreign investment
fund to its purely foreign customers.104 The Madoffdecision ex-
tended the Morrison presumption of extraterritoriality to the
bankruptcy field.105
The presumption against extraterritoriality should apply
with equal strength in the context of the Volcker Rule. Deutsche
Bundesbank highlighted the necessity of limiting the scope of
extraterritorial application of the Volcker Rule: We also regard 
it as very important that the U.S. authorities limit the scope of
the Volcker Rule to foreign banks U.S. operations and to ap-
prove adequate home standards for foreign banks.106
B. The Volcker Rule Violates the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality
In Morrison, the Supreme Court strongly expounded the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality.107 Even where the statute or
regulation at issue contains an explicit provision for extraterri-
torial application, the Court compelled a narrow reading of that
101 Id. at 228.
102 Id. at 23031. 
103 Id. at 23132. The principle of international comity refers to the 
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, execu-
tive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws. Id. (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 16364 (1895)) (citations omitted). See infra Part IV for a further
discussion of the potential impact of double regulation.
104 Madoff, 513 B.R. at 232.
105 Id.
106 Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 50.
107 Morrison v. Natl Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 27273 (2010). 
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provision.108 Various additional sources corroborate the necessity
of a narrow reading if the federal statute or regulation at issue
explicitly provides for extraterritorial application, such that the
presumption against extraterritoriality is overcome.109 Once the
presumption is overcome, the reasonableness of extraterritorial
application is evaluated using the following criteria:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
the extent to which enforcement by either state can
be expected to achieve compliance;
the relative significance of effects on the United
States as compared with those elsewhere;
the extent to which there is an explicit purpose to
harm or affect American commerce or interests; and
the foreseeability of such an effect.110
Application of these factors to all U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
banking entities indicates a finding of unreasonableness. While
proponents of the Rule point to the goal of financial stability and
the protection of American interests, it is unreasonable to sub-
ject the small branch office of a foreign bank to such regulations.
The explicit purpose111 of protecting U.S. interests does not
exist in such cases.112 The foreseeability of U.S. interests being
harmed by this small U.S. presence is correspondingly low, as
that small branch office or insignificant subsidiary likely does
not engage in proprietary trading to an appreciable extent.113
The presumption against extraterritoriality demands a
stricter limitation on the scope of extraterritorial application of the
Volcker Rules prohibition on proprietary trading. At a minimum, 
108 Id. at 27172. 
109 See 44B Am. Jur. 2d InternationalLaw § 71 (2014).
110 Id. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the European approach to
regulating proprietary trading, as well as the potential for double regulation
as a result.
111 Id.
112 Here, the explicit purpose of preventing the too big to fail problem 
should not extend abroad to foreign banks in the form of extensive compli-
ance measures.
113 A notable assumption is made here: subsidiaries comprising less than 25
percent of the global operations of a foreign bank do not retain a sufficiently
significant presence in the United States to warrant compliance with the
Volcker Rule.
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the statutory language should be read narrowly, as required by
the Supreme Court in Morrison.
C. The Volcker Rule Is Too Inflexible
In addition to violating the presumption against extraterrito-
riality, the Volcker Rule also fails to take into account situations
in which the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign-organized parent com-
pany represents only a minimal proportion of the parents overall 
operations.114 The bright-line rule disregards a foreign company
with a branch office located in the United States with only minor
operations.115 Both scenarios do not justify imposition of Volcker
regulations, which necessarily impose substantial compliance obli-
gations on the foreign parent. This is extraterritoriality pushed
to an unfortunate extreme, and the Volcker Rule fails to provide
flexibility for such cases.
Further, the Volcker Rule fails to acknowledge an inherent
hypocrisy. The Rule requires subsidiaries of U.S. companies
abroad to comply with Volcker regulations, and yet also imposes
the regulations on subsidiaries of foreign banks located in the
United States.116 Why subject one set of subsidiaries to U.S. law,
and not allow foreign parents to regulate their subsidiaries lo-
cated in the United States? Which set of regulations should gov-
ern in such cases? While the questions posed have generated
criticism in the financial world, the Volcker Rule settles with an
assertion of territorial jurisdiction as the basis for imposing U.S.
regulations on subsidiaries of foreign banks transacting busi-
ness in the United States.117 Pursuant to the final Volcker Rule,
foreign banks are only exempted if they can meet the SOTUS
exception.118 Determining whether a particular transaction
qualifies for the SOTUS exception in the first place, however,
requires extensive analysis by the foreign bank to ensure that it
114 See Coffee, supra note 29, at 1295.
115 Id. (posing a similar question regarding application of the Volcker Rule
to a single branch office of a foreign bank in the United States).
116 DAVIS POLK LLP, supra note 25, at 34. 
117 Coffee, supra note 29, at 1297 (acknowledging that extraterritorial appli-
cation of the Volcker Rule based on mere presence is problematic but ultimately
finding that an assertion of territorial jurisdiction is the correct approach).
118 The SOTUS exception is discussed supra Part I.
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meets all applicable requirements.119 This process could result
in substantial compliance costs to disentangle the transaction
from a nexus to the United States. Foreign banks with but a mere
presence in the United States still need to ensure that the
transaction in question does not involve that U.S. branch office
in any way.120 The Volcker Rule proves inflexible because it fails
to take into account circumstances that do not warrant imposing
significant compliance costs on foreign banks.121
Although proponents of the extraterritorial application of the
Volcker Rule regard it as a necessary evil to protect American 
interests,122 the presumption against extraterritorial application
of U.S. laws necessitates a line-drawing exercise.123 Exactly where
to best draw that line is quite controversial, perhaps even elusive.
The final Volcker Rule draws the line as follows: U.S.-organized
banking entities, including all of their worldwide subsidiaries,
are subject to the Volcker Rule;124 and foreign-organized bank-
ing entities are not themselves subject to the Volcker Rule, but
any subsidiaries located in the United States are.125 For example,
a U.S. banks subsidiaries in Germany must comply with Volcker 
regulations.126 A German banks subsidiaries located in the United 
States must similarly comply.127 However, the German banks 
operations within Germany, or anywhere else outside of the
territorial United States, are not subject to the Volcker Rule.128
The basis for an assertion of jurisdiction in the case of subsidi-
aries of foreign banks located in the United States is traditional
territorial jurisdiction.129 The rationale is simple: by operating a
subsidiary in the United States, that subsidiary must comply
with U.S. regulations.130 However, the Volcker Rule complicates
119 See Coffee, supra note 29, at 128990. 
120 Id. at 1295.
121 Id. at 1293.
122 See Greenberger, supra note 79, at 96566. 
123 Coffee, supra note 29, at 1271 (arguing that a line-drawing exercise is
necessary).
124 DAVIS POLK LLP, supra note 25, at 34.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Coffee, supra note 29, at 1297.
130 While it is true that territorial jurisdiction would subject the subsidi-
aries of foreign banks located in the United States to all requirements that
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the situation because compliance costs of engaging in proprie-
tary trading often extend far beyond the U.S. subsidiary.131 In-
deed, the effects of Volcker Rule compliance do extend back to
the parent located abroad, as the parent must either comply or
conduct its proprietary trading abroad such that it qualifies for
the SOTUS exception.132 The extensive compliance measures
specified in lengthy, complicated, and detailed appendices re-
quire manpower and substantial amounts of paperwork that
place a significant burden on the foreign bank.133
The Volcker Rule fails to comply with the presumption
against extraterritoriality. In the alternative, even if that pre-
sumption is overcome, the extraterritorial provision should be
read narrowly, as required by both Morrison and Madoff.
IV. THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO RESTRICTING PROPRIETARY
TRADING AND THE POTENTIAL FOR DOUBLE REGULATION
The European Union, as well as both Germany and the United
Kingdom individually, have proposed regulations aimed at bank
reform in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.134 In January of
2014, the European Commission published a proposal to regu-
late E.U. credit institutions135 due to concern that several E.U.
banks were too big to fail, too big to save, and too complex to 
ordinary U.S. banks must comply with, the effects of requiring compliance from
all such subsidiaries extend far beyond the territorial borders of the United
States. Compliance costs certainly extend to the foreign parent located abroad,
and perhaps even further to other subsidiaries located abroad.
131 See supra Part II.B for a full discussion of the compliance costs imposed
on the foreign parent bank as a result of Volcker regulations.
132 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(H) (2012).
133 See A USERS GUIDE TO THE VOLCKER RULE, supra note 17, at 2631; 12 
U.S.C. § 1851.
134 MAYER BROWN LLP, LEGAL UPDATE: DOES VOLCKER + VICKERS = LIIKANEN?
EU PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION ON STRUCTURAL MEASURES IMPROVES THE
RESILIENCE OF EU CREDIT INSTITUTIONS (Feb. 2014), http://www.mayerbrown
.com/files/Publication/f6722a7a-b666-4384-931f-0f77d6424e37/Presentation/Publi
cationAttachment/1a249a85-3015-43eb-8389-26237a62e419/update_volcker_vick
ers_feb14.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2Z9-B44F]; Steven Harras, European regulators
giving second look to Volcker-like rule, top U.S. regulators tell Congress, CONG.
Q. (2014).
135 EUR. COMMN, PROPOSAL ON BANKING STRUCTURAL REFORM (Jan. 29,
2014), http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/structural-reform/ [https://perma.cc
/ARH5-UBWL].
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manage, supervise and resolve.136 The European Commission
drew upon the Liikanen Report, a Finnish-led effort to study
and recommend necessary changes to E.U. banking structure.137
At its core, the Liikanen Report proposes a novel method of pre-
venting these problems: require banks to segregate their trading
activities from their retail banking business.138 As Raimund
Roeseler, Chief Executive Director of the German Federal Fi-
nancial Supervisory Authority,139 noted in his praise of the
Liikanen Report,140 the proposed regulations would be limited in
scope.141 The strict regulations would only apply to banking en-
tities that are sufficiently large and interlinked, and would not 
apply to most medium and smaller-sized institutions.142
However, while these European regulations have the same
purpose as the Volcker Rule in achieving structural reform in
the banking field, they differ in their approach. Both Germany
and the United Kingdom, in line with the Liikanen Report, pro-
posed measures whereby investment banking operations are
separated from remaining operations.143 Germany adopted the
Trennbankengesetz (German Banking Separation Law), which
became effective on January 31, 2014.144 Pursuant to this law,
German banks are required to separate their investment arms
containing hedge funds from the rest of their core operations.145
136 MAYER BROWN LLP, supra note 134.
137 Erkki Liikanen et al., High-levelExpert Group on reforming the struc-
ture ofthe EU banking sector, EUR. COMMN (Oct. 2, 2012), http://ec.europa
.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4AK4-WZQT]; Coffee, supra note 29, at 1291.
138 International Securities and Financial Reporting Update, 2013 WL
8369333 (C.C.H.), Vol. 8, No. 1, Jan. 17, 2013; Coffee, supra note 29, at 1291.
139 The German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt
für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) performs similar functions as the United
States Securities & Exchange Commission.
140 Liikanen et al., supra note 137.
141 International Securities and Financial Reporting Update, supra note 138.
142 Id. As discussed infra Part V, a limitation on the scope of the Volcker
Rule adopts an approach that is similar to the Liikanen Reports approach. 
143 MAYER BROWN LLP, supra note 134.
144 Trennbankengesetz [German Banking Separation Law], Aug. 13, 2013,
BGBl. I S. 3090 (Ger.). Although the Trennbankengesetz has already been
passed, most of the provisions pertaining to banks do not become effective
until July 1, 2015. MAYER BROWN LLP, supra note 134.
145 Keine Erleichterung fuer die Deutsche Bank, HANDELSBLATT (Nov. 4,
2014, 1:04 PM), http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/trennbank
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Similarly, the United Kingdoms Vickers report, issued by the 
Independent Commission on Banking in September 2011,146 pro-
posed ringfencing, whereby U.K. banks are required to ringfence, 
or legally and operationally separate their investment banking
operations from the rest of their business.147 Although the United
Kingdom has not yet adopted formal legislation to implement
the recommendation stemming from the Vickers report, the U.K.
government responded positively, and had hopes of implement-
ing legislation in 2015.148 If implemented, compliance would be
required by 2019.149 Unlike Germany, the E.U. Commission has
not been willing to go so far as the Trennbankengesetzand has
not yet made the ringfencing provision mandatory.150
Although legislation has not yet been passed in the United
Kingdom and the European Commission is still in the initial pro-
cess of implementing further reform, regulations were expected as
early as 2015, coinciding with the deadline for compliance with the
Volcker Rule.151 Theoretically, then, U.S. subsidiaries of European
engesetz-keine-erleichterung-fuer-die-deutsche-bank-/10930660.html# [https://
perma.cc/MJ4F-EW6J].
146 Jill Treanor, Vickers report: keypoints, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2011, 3:49 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/sep/12/vickers-report-key-points
[https://perma.cc/2UJ9-EWRC].
147 Id.
148 Coffee, supra note 29, at 1292. The Bank of England noted that it
intended to issue final rules regarding ringfencing in 2016, but as of the time
of this writing, the final rules have not yet been issued. Policy Statement, Bank
of England Prudential Regulation Authority, The implementation of ring-
fencing: legal structure, governance and the continuity of services and facili-
tiesPS10/15 (May 27, 2015), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/publi 
cations/ps/2015/ps1015.aspx [https://perma.cc/L7KK-BQTJ]. See also BANK OF
ENGLAND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY, CONSULTATION PAPER CP37/15,
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RING-FENCING: PRUDENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, INTRA-
GROUP ARRANGEMENTS AND USE OF FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES (Oct.
2015), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/cp/2015
/cp3715.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GBE-JNVK].
149 Coffee, supra note 29, at 1292 (citing EUR. COMMN, FINAL REPORT OF
HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF THE E.U. BANK-
ING SECTOR, at i (Oct. 2, 2012)).
150 Keine Erleichterung fuer die Deutsche Bank, supra note 145.
151 Coffee, supra note 29, at 1292 (citing EUR. COMMN, FINAL REPORT OF
HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF THE E.U.
BANKING SECTOR, at i (Oct. 2, 2012)). At the time of this writing, the E.U. Com-
mission has not yet provided further guidance regarding a timeline for imple-
mentation of its ringfencing proposals.
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banks might be subject to two potentially very different regula-
tions: both the Volcker Rule and European regulations governing
some form of ringfencing. Requiring U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
banks to comply with two very detailed sets of compliance mea-
sures is irrational and overly cumbersome for all parties.
Further, if a measure like the Trennbankengesetzapplies to
the entity, then the parent will already be required to legally
separate its risky investment operations.152 This change is likely
to affect its subsidiaries as well, although the specific effect is
unclear. Requiring a subsidiary to comply with two very different,
detailed, and compliance-heavy regulations potentially imposes
significant hardship on the foreign bank.
If and when implemented, European measures like the
Trennbankengesetz will subject foreign parent banks with U.S.
subsidiaries to two sets of cumbersome requirements. To avoid
the potential for double regulation of foreign banks, the bright-
line rule contained within the Volcker Rule should be amended
to allow for increased flexibility.
V. ONE POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE: EXEMPT U.S. SUBSIDIARIES OF
FOREIGN BANKS REPRESENTING LESS THAN 25 PERCENT OF THE
FOREIGN PARENTS OPERATIONS
While the core goal of the Volcker Rule, implemented as part
of the too big to fail legislation, is to prevent future financial
crises,153 the aforementioned controversial aspects of the Volcker
Rule demonstrate the difficulties of regulation in an increasingly
interconnected global economy. The United States cannot im-
pose its rules without first ascertaining an appropriate jurisdic-
tional basis. The line certainly must be drawn somewhere, but
the Volcker Rule simply extends too far in the name of crisis
prevention by requiring all U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks,
regardless of size, to comply with Volcker Rule regulations.
Bright-line rules will always generate substantial difficulties,
especially in the field of financial regulation.154 One alternative
152 Trennbankengesetz, supra note 144.
153 Coffee, supra note 4, at 1056, 1060.
154 Use of a bright-line or single-factor test for that sort of question would 
be at odds with the tendency of modern jurisprudence and would lead to seri-
ously undesirable results, likely to be incompatible with the main objectives
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is to make the Rule more flexible by imposing a limitation on the
scope of Volcker regulation by exempting U.S. subsidiaries of
foreign parents that comprise less than 25 percent of the total
operations of the foreign parent.155 Here, as with all such regu-
lations, a line-drawing exercise becomes necessary yet again.156
This addresses the example set out above, in which a European-
organized bank maintains only one small subsidiary in the
United States.157 The substantial compliance costs facing that
small subsidiary will necessarily extend beyond the territorial
borders to the foreign parent.158 If the 25 percent rule were to
govern, that insignificant subsidiary would be exempt from com-
pliance with the Volcker Rule.159
Further, as previously described, the foreign bank might be
required to comply with foreign regulations like the Trennbank-
engesetz or prospective legislation in other European countries
that are designed to combat the same problems as the Volcker
Rule.160 In the event that the U.S. subsidiary does engage in a
substantial amount of proprietary trading, then foreign regula-
tions likely already cover that activity.161 While critics would
argue that exempting subsidiaries of foreign banks located in
of the Morrison opinion. Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Hold-
ings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 220 (2d Cir. 2014).
155 See Coffee, supra note 29, at 1295 (proposing that limiting the reach of
the Volcker Rule to foreign banks may be justified).
156 While bright-line rules are generally disfavored, the proposal intro-
duced simply expands the bright-line rule already contained in the final version
of the Volcker Rule. Thus, it is consistent with the holding in Parkcentral.
ParkcentralGlobalHubLtd., 763 F.3d at 220.
157 See supra Part III.C.
158 See supra Part II.B for a case study that details the significant com-
pliance costs the Volcker Rule imposes on foreign banks as a result of their
U.S. subsidiaries being required to comply with Volcker regulations.
159 If the insignificant subsidiary is not forced to comply with the Volcker
Rule, then the parent bank is not required to expend significant resources in
the name of compliance.
160 See supra Part IV for a discussion of double regulation and the potential
negative consequences associated with requiring foreign banks to comply with
both their own regulations, as well as requiring their U.S. subsidiaries to comply
with Volcker regulations.
161 As discussed supra Part IV, several European Union countries have
already enacted legislation designed to address the too big to fail problem, or 
have plans to implement such legislation prospectively.
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the United States creates an enclave and leads to uneven en-
forcement of the Volcker Rule,162 the aforementioned foreign
regulations would kick in to regulate proprietary trading of that
subsidiary. As noted in In re Midland Euro Exch. Inc., the desire
to avoid loopholes in the law, including uneven enforcement,
must be balanced against the presumption against extraterrito-
riality, which serves to protect against unintended clashes be-
tween our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord.163
While the 25 percent number may appear to be arbitrary,
imposing this standard preserves the Obama administrations 
core goal of preventing the too big to fail problem.164 The 25
percent rule is a very low standard, meaning that the Volcker
Rule would still apply to the vast majority of U.S. subsidiaries of
foreign parents.165 Only small subsidiaries would be exempt.
The 25 percent rule would add more flexibility to the rigid
Volcker Rule by carving out an additional exception that ac-
counts for cases in which requiring compliance is controversial.
CONCLUSION
The Volcker Rule is a unique innovation implemented by the
Obama administration to combat the too big to fail problem in 
todays increasingly interconnected economy. However, the Rule 
requires some revision in order to more fully balance the signifi-
cant costs imposed on foreign banks through their U.S. subsidi-
aries. While there is likely no perfect solution to this important
dilemma, the bright-line rule included in the December 2013
final version of the Volcker Rule is too rigid and inflexible. Further,
the Rule fails to comply with the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality that has been enshrined in the Courts jurisprudence 
in Morrison, expanded upon in Kiobeland Microsoft Corp., and
most recently reemphasized in Madoff. Finally, the Rule potentially
subjects foreign banking entities to double regulation.
162 See Greenberger, supra note 79, at 96566. 
163 In re Midland Euro Exch. Inc., 347 B.R. 708, 726 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006)
(citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
164 See WallStreet Reform: The Dodd-FrankAct, supra note 10.
165 See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h) (2012).
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The Volcker Rules inherent deficiencies require revision. 
This Notes proposed solution provides one potential framework
for accomplishing an efficient revision of the Rule. By exempting
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks that comprise less than 25
percent of the parents global operations, the proposed solution 
introduces a modicum of flexibility into an otherwise rigid rule.
Mr. Volckers aims remain preserved, as the proposal only exempts 
a small portion of U.S. subsidiaries from compliance. Far from
eliminating all compliance with Volcker regulations, the pro-
posal simply exempts those small and insignificant subsidiaries
in order to minimize compliance expenditures. While a perfect
solution to the risk inherent in our global economy remains elu-
sive, the proposal described would introduce a small degree of
flexibility to, while retaining the core aims of, Mr. Volckers Rule. 
